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Summary : Few forms of market exchange intrigue economists as do auctions, whose theoretical and practical implications are enormous. John Kagel and Dan Levin, complementing their own distinguished research with papers written with other specialists, provide a new focus on common value auctions and the "winner's curse." In such auctions the value of each item is about the same to all bidders, but different bidders have different information about the underlying value. Virtually all auctions have a common value element; among the burgeoning modern-day examples are those organized by Internet companies such as eBay. Winners end up cursing when they realize that they won because their estimates were overly optimistic, which led them to bid too much and lose money as a result. The authors first unveil a fresh survey of experimental data on the winner's curse. Melding theory with the econometric analysis of field data, they assess the design of government auctions, such as the spectrum rights (air wave) auctions that continue to be conducted around the world. The remaining chapters gauge the impact on sellers' revenue of the type of auction used and of inside information, show how bidders learn to avoid the winner's curse, and present comparisons of sophisticated bidders with college sophomores, the usual guinea pigs used in laboratory experiments. Appendixes refine theoretical arguments and, in some cases, present entirely new data. This book is an invaluable, impeccably up-to-date resource on how auctions work--and how to make them work.
Summary : “Packed with transformative insights, Dealmaking will help a new generation of business leaders get to yes.”—William Ury, coauthor of Getting to Yes Informed by meticulous research, field experience, and classroom-tested strategies, Dealmaking offers essential insights for anyone involved in buying or selling everything from cars to corporations. Leading business scholar Guhan Subramanian provides a lively tour of both negotiation and auction theory, then takes an in-depth look at his own hybrid theory, outlining three specific strategies readers can use in complex dealmaking situations. Along the way, he examines case studies as diverse as buying a house, haggling over the rights to a TV show, and participating in the auction of a multimillion-dollar company. Based on broad research and detailed case studies, Dealmaking brings together negotiation and auction strategies for the first time, providing the jargon-free, empirically sound advice professionals need to close the deal. Originally published in hardcover under the title Negotiauctions.
Summary : This book in microeconomics focuses on the strategic analysis of markets under imperfect competition, incomplete information, and incentives. Part I of the book covers imperfect competition, from monopoly and regulation to the strategic analysis of oligopolistic markets. Part II explains the analytics of risk, stochastic dominance, and risk aversion, supplemented with a variety of applications from different areas in economics. Part III focuses on markets and incentives under incomplete information, including a comprehensive introduction to the theory of auctions, which plays an important role in modern economics.
Summary : Governments use them to sell everything from oilfields to pollution permits, and to privatize companies; consumers rely on them to buy baseball tickets and hotel rooms, and economic theorists employ them to explain booms and busts. Auctions make up many of the world's most important markets; and this book describes how auction theory has also become an invaluable tool for understanding economics. Auctions: Theory and Practice provides a non-technical introduction to auction theory, and emphasises its practical application. Although there are many extremely successful auction markets, there have also been some notable fiascos, and Klemperer provides many examples. He discusses the successes and failures of the one-hundred-billion dollar "third-generation" mobile-phone license auctions; he, jointly with Ken Binmore, designed the first of these. Klemperer also demonstrates the surprising power of auction theory to explain seemingly unconnected issues such as the intensity of different forms of industrial competition, the costs of litigation, and even stock trading 'frenzies' and financial crashes. Engagingly written, the book makes the subject exciting not only to economics students but to anyone interested in auctions and their role in economics.
Summary : With the development of the Internet from a research network to a commercial and integrated network which must satisfy heterogeneous user demand, prices for Internet usage play an important role. This study analyzes the pricing of Internet transport services and interconnection. It explains why appropriate pricing requires popular flat rates to be abandoned. They should be replaced by usage-based prices which are load-sensitive and take different service qualities into consideration. The aim of this work is to give an overview of Internet pricing proposals, to classify, investigate, and evaluate these pricing schemes as well as to elaborate on relations between them. Evaluations are based on normative criteria for Internet pricing from the point of view of social welfare and the perspectives of both Internet service providers and users. Moreover, this book shows what efficient settlement rules look like at the interconnection level. Since these interconnection pricing agreements are closely related to retail pricing models the compatibility between them is also analyzed.
Summary : This book provides a comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its important new applications. It is written by a leading economic theorist whose suggestions guided the creation of the new spectrum auction designs. Aimed at graduate students and professionals in economics, the book gives the most up-to-date treatments of both traditional theories of 'optimal auctions' and newer theories of multi-unit auctions and package auctions, and shows by example how these theories are used. The analysis explores the limitations of prominent older designs, such as the Vickrey auction design, and evaluates the practical responses to those limitations. It explores the tension between the traditional theory of auctions with a fixed set of bidders, in which the seller seeks to squeeze as much revenue as possible from the fixed set, and the theory of auctions with endogenous entry, in which bidder profits must be respected to encourage participation.
Summary : Distinguished authors like Daniel Kahneman, Dan Ariely, and Nassim Nicholas Taleb have written much about the flaws in the human brain when it comes time to make a decision. Our intuitions and passions frequently fail us, leading to outcomes we don't want. In this book, Eyal Winter, Professor of Economics and Director of the Center for the Study of Rationality at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, wonders: why? If our emotions are so destructive and unreliable, why has evolution left us with them? The answer is that, even though they may not behave in a purely logical manner, our emotions frequently lead us to better, safer, more optimal outcomes. In fact, as Winter discovers, there is often logic in emotion, and emotion in logic. For instance, many mutually beneficial commitments—such as marriage, or being a member of a team—are only possible when underscored by emotion rather than deliberate thought. The difference between pleasurable music and bad noise is mathematically precise; yet it is also the result of evolution. And our inherent overconfidence—the mathematically impossible fact that most people see themselves as above average—affords us advantages in competing for things we benefit from, like food and money and romance. Other subjects illuminated in the book include the rationality of seemingly illogical feelings like trust, anger, shame, ego, and generosity. Already a bestseller in Israel, Feeling Smart brings together game theory, evolution, and behavioral science to produce a surprising and very persuasive defense of how we think, even when we don't.
Summary : Sponsored Search Auctions reviews current academic research on this nascent topic with a focus on future practical and research opportunities
Summary : Issues for Feb. 1965-Aug. 1967 include Bulletin of the Institute of Management Sciences.
Summary : We review the main issues that arise in the design of treasury bill auctions and survey the relevant empirical literature. We also provide a detailed description of the actual design of these auctions in a sample of 42 industrial and developing countries.